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Gender and Opinion–Policy Congruence in Europe 




In a wellfunctioning democracy, public policy should not systematically reflect the preferences 
of some groups of citizens less well than those of others. Yet, it is often believed that this is the 
case for women, with one potential reason being their lower presence in politics. However, we 
lack systematic empirical evidence on the representation of women’s and men’s preferences in 
concrete policy. This study provides such evidence for a diverse set of twenty specific policy 
issues in 31 European countries. While the majorities of men and women often desire the same 
policies, men’s preferences are more likely to be represented when they disagree. This pattern 
can neither be explained by the proportion of women in parliament nor by the left–right position 
of the government. In contrast, a higher effective number of political parties increases women’s 
relative representation, while electoral system proportionality does not. ‘New politics’ issues play 
a key role here, but differences in women’s representation do not seem to be due to presence of 
Green parties and government positions on the libertarianauthoritarian dimension. 


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One of the main principles and goals of representative democracy is that policy ought to – at least 
roughly – reflect citizens’ preferences. It is what Hanna Pitkin (1967) termed ‘substantive 
representation’. Policy representation is certainly not the only criterion for judging the quality of 
democracy, and in cases where it is in tension with government responsibilities or fundamental 
human rights a closer link between the majority opinion and policy may even be undesirable. 
Yet, it is an important indicator of whether ‘government by the people’ is functioning, and one 
that has received growing attention from political scientists (e.g. Lax and Phillips 2012; Monroe 
1998; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Citizens also seem to care, as they evaluate the quality of their 
democratic system based on how well they are represented (e.g. Ezrow and Xezonakis 2010; 
Reher 2015). 
However, modern democracies have a problem not only if policy is out of step with the 
preferences of the people, but also if grave inequalities exist in the representation of the views of 
different social groups. As Sidney Verba (2003: 663) states, “one of the bedrock principles in a 
democracy is the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens”. 
Consequently, a growing number of studies investigate whether disparities exist in the 
representation of different social groups, the majority of which focus on the rich and the poor 
(e.g. Bartels 2008; Bernauer et al. 2015; Brunner et al. 2013; Gilens 2012; Peters and Ensink 
2015; Soroka and Wlezien 2008).  
This study focuses on a societal group that is underrepresented in politics up to this day: 
women. They hold fewer seats in parliaments and posts in governments across the world, 
including the most advanced democracies. This might have consequences for the degree to which 
policy reflects the views of women, since it is often argued that women may be better at 
representing women (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). Several studies suggest that women’s 
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numerical or ‘descriptive’ representation (Pitkin 1967) and the degree to which their interests are 
reflected in politics are indeed linked (e.g. Bratton and Ray 2002; Kittilson 2008; Schwindt
Bayer and Mishler 2005). However, despite this research we know relatively little about how 
well the policies in place actually align with the views of women as compared to men.  
The first aim of this study is to extend our knowledge about the existence of gender 
inequality in substantive representation in Europe by assessing how well the preferences of 
women and men are reflected in public policy across a wide variety of domains. The study draws 
on public opinion data from major crossnational surveys on a diverse set of 20 specific issues in 
31 European countries, matched with information on policy collected from a range of 
governmental, academic, interest group, and media sources. This data shows that the majorities of 
women and men prefer the same policy in an overwhelming majority of cases. Interestingly, 
women and men strongly agree on issues typically regarded as ‘women’s issues’, whereas most 
disagreement exists on ‘new politics’ issues. Importantly, the findings provide evidence for a 
gender gap in representation: in those cases where women and men disagree, policy is more 
likely to reflect the preferences of men.  
The second aim of the study is to investigate what might explain these differences. 
Interestingly, neither the proportion of women in parliament nor the left–right position of the 
government appear to affect whether policy is congruent with the preferences of women or men, 
despite large literatures showing that women tend to be more leftwing (e.g. Bergh 2007; 
Campbell 2004; Gidengil et al. 2003; Bernauer et al. 2015) and that the female legislators are 
more likely to promote women’s rights and interests (e.g. Bratton and Haynie 1999; Campbell et 
al. 2010; Celis 2006; Swers 1998; TaylorRobinson and Heath 2003; Thomas 1991; Vega and 
Firestone 1995).  
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In contrast, a higher number of parliamentary parties does seem to improve women’s 
representation. This holds when controlling for the proportionality of the electoral system as well 
as women’s descriptive representation, which has been shown to be strongly affected by electoral 
rules (e.g. Matland and Studlar 1996). The effect might be due to small parties placing issues on 
the agenda which have received less attention from the mainstream parties but appear to be the 
major point of contention between men and women. However, neither the government position 
on the libertarianauthoritarian dimension nor the presence of Green parties can explain women’s 
policy congruence. The effect of the number of parties might thus be due to other institutions and 
practices introduced by parties which benefit the representation of women’s opinions. In addition 
to providing important novel evidence on the state of gender equality in policy representation in 
Europe, the study thus provides an agenda for further research into the explanations of women’s 
representation.  
 
			
	 
Although the number of women in politics has increased over the last decades, they are still in the 
minority in parliaments across Europe (Figure 1). While women hold 44 per cent of the seats in 
the Swedish parliament, the European average is much lower with 29 per cent, and in Hungary 
only 10 per cent of parliamentarians are women. This raises the question whether women’s views 
are also underrepresented in the output of the political process, meaning the laws that govern 
European societies. It is somewhat surprising that we have not yet answered this question. A few 
studies have assessed different aspects of women’s policy representation in Europe. Homola 
(2017) shows that although the manifestos of European parties respond to shifts in the left–right 
positions of both genders, they seem to be more responsive to men. Yet, this does not necessarily 
result in unequal representation in parliament: as Bernauer, Giger and Rosset (2015) show, 
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women tend to be more leftleaning but are not consistently further away from the most 
proximate parliamentary party than men. 
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
Although representation in terms of political ideology is undoubtedly important, neither 
parties’ nor citizens’ positions on specific policy issues always neatly align with the left–right 
dimension or even several ideological dimensions (e.g. Converse 1964; Dolezal et al. 2013). We 
should therefore also examine how well the public is represented on more narrow issues and in 
concrete policy outcomes (Thomassen 2012). So far, this strategy has mostly been employed in 
studies of the representation of income groups (e.g. Brunner et al. 2013; Gilens 2012; Soroka and 
Wlezien 2008) and of the overall public (e.g. Lax and Phillips 2012; Monroe 1998; Page and 
Shapiro 1983). In the context of gender, a recent study by Dingler, Kroeber and FortinRittberger 
(2018) investigates whether inequalities exist in the congruence between public opinion and the 
positions of parliaments around Europe, measured by expert placements of parties on seven 
policy dimensions. Interestingly, they find that women’s views are overall better represented than 
men’s. Outside of Europe, an analysis of rollcall votes in the US House of Representatives by 
Griffin, Newman and Wolbrecht (2012) reveals that the underrepresentation of women’s views in 
districts represented by Republicans is counterbalanced by their better representation in 
Democratic districts.  
While these studies look beyond left–right ideology, their results still do not tell us how 
well women’s preferences are reflected in actual policy. First, rather than parliaments as a whole, 
it is primarily governments which determine which policies are put into place. Yet, analyzing 
government positions is still not sufficient since they cannot always implement their preferences: 
they need to prioritize among issues, bargain with coalition partners, overcome institutional 
hurdles, and react to events, changing economic conditions etc. It is possible that these ‘frictions’ 
Page 5 of 52
Cambridge University Press
The European Political Science Review
6 
(e.g. Baumgartner et al. 2009; Bevan and Greene 2016) introduce biases in the policymaking 
process that result in policies that are less reflective of women’s preferences than men’s, even if 
no gender inequalities exist in the positions of parliaments and governments. By looking at 
women’s and men’s support of implemented policies, this study thus extends our knowledge of 
women’s representation in Europe to a further stage of the representation process. 
Hypothesis 1: 	
			
			 
 
		
	

		
The second objective of this study is to examine what might explain gender differences in policy 
representation across Europe. While there are a range of potentially important variables, the focus 
here is on three political factors: women’s descriptive representation, the ideology of the 
government, and electoral and party systems.  
 
 
As Anne Phillips (1995) famously contended, women’s presence in politics will in certain 
contexts strengthen their substantive policy representation, since they have some (largely though 
not universally) shared interests and experiences that are not shared by men. These interests and 
experiences give rise to policy preferences which women will be more likely to promote due to 
their higher awareness and commitment (cf. also Mansbridge 1999). A vast number of studies 
have empirically examined this argument from different angles (Wängnerud 2009). Women 
legislators tend to place stronger emphasis on issues related to women, children, and family 
(Thomas 1991, 1994), support social welfare (Poggione 2004; Wängnerud 2000), and promote 
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women’s rights and gender equality (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Campbell et al. 2010; Celis 2006; 
Swers 1998; TaylorRobinson and Heath 2003; Thomas 1991; Vega and Firestone 1995). These 
differences are to a large degree mirrored in the public (Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 2000). Parties 
with more women MPs also address greater sets of issues and become more leftleaning (Greene 
and O’Brien 2016). 
On the other hand, parliaments with high numbers of women are neither necessarily nor 
exclusively ‘gendersensitive parliaments’ (Wängnerud 2015). Political parties play a crucial role 
by conditioning how gender shapes legislators’ attitudes and actions (e.g. Osborn 2012; Poggione 
2004) and even overshadowing its role (e.g. Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Swers 1998). 
Qualitative studies by Sawer (2012) and Childs and Withey (2006) elucidate the importance of 
individual or small groups of women who become ‘critical actors’ (cf. Childs and Krook 2009) as 
well as of specific networks and institutions. Others emphasize the importance of cabinets (e.g. 
Atchison 2015) or women’s movements and policy agencies (e.g. Htun and Weldon 2012; 
Weldon 2002; Stetson and Mazur 1995) as key arenas beyond parliaments in which women 
promote their interests. 
Reflecting this disagreement about the impact of women’s ‘mere’ presence in parliaments 
on policy outcomes, the studies that have tested this relationship arrive at varying conclusions. In 
the US, Thomas (1991) shows that the proportion of women in state legislatures is unrelated to 
the passage of bills linked to women, children, or families. Griffin, Newman and Wolbrecht 
(2012) find that women are not better represented by female representatives. In contrast, 
SchwindtBayer and Mishler (2005) observe effects of women’s descriptive representation on 
maternity leave, marriage equality laws, and political and social gender equality. Kittilson (2008) 
finds effects on parental leave across postindustrial democracies and Bratton and Ray (2002) on 
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municipal child care in Norway. Meanwhile, mixed effects have been found in Swedish local 
councils (Wängnerud and Sundell 201) and in the Argentine Congress (Htun et al. 2013). 
While these studies provide important insights, most of them focus on a specific set of 
policies or measures of gender equality and do not empirically assess women’s and men’s 
preferences. Usually, this approach reflects a deliberate decision to study the representation of 
women’s  through the promotion ‘feminist policy’ (Mazur 2002). These interests are 
derived not from expressed preferences but from women’s distinct experiences and the goals of 
women’s rights and equal status (Phillips 1995; Waylen 2007). The study presented here pursues 
a different objective, namely to assess the degree to which the expressed  of women 
and men are reflected in policy. This aim calls for an empirical examination of the views of both 
women and men across a wide variety of policy issues, for at least two reasons.  
First, women and men have a range of identities beyond their gender (cf. Campbell et al. 
2010; Childs and Withey 2006: 11). This means that their preferences are likely heterogeneous 
(for instance, many women are opposed to abortion (cf. Shapiro and Mahajan 1986)) and might 
often be very similar to men’s. Moreover, these patterns are likely to vary across contexts. 
Second, women and men might disagree substantially on policy issues that are not usually 
considered ‘women’s issues’, meaning that some inequalities might have gone unnoticed. This 
study addresses both issues by measuring women’s and men’s preferences on a diverse range of 
policy issues. Using a similar framework, Dingler and colleagues (2018) find no effect of 
descriptive representation on women’s relative congruence with parliaments’ issue positions. Yet, 
as discussed above, comparing women’s and men’s views with concrete policy might yield 
different conclusions. 
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Hypothesis 2: 							
 	 	   	
    		  	 	 	


 !" # $%
While women had traditionally been more conservative in their views and voting behavior in 
most Western democracies, these patterns reversed in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century through a ‘realignment’ that led to the ‘modern gender gap’ (Inglehart and Norris 2000). 
Several explanations have been proposed for why women now tend to hold more leftwing 
attitudes (Campbell 2004; Gidengil et al. 2003; Bernauer et al. 2015) and show stronger support 
for leftwing parties (see also Bergh 2007). First, their lower salary and higher poverty levels, 
their greater reliance public services such as childcare and social care services as well as their 
higher degree of public sector employment might make them more supportive of the welfare state 
and public spending (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Knutsen 2001; Gidengil et al. 2003; but see 
Bergh 2007).  
Second, the greater support for feminist ideas and equality more generally that leftwing 
parties tend to display might attract more voters with a ‘feminist consciousness’ (Hayes 1997). 
Finally, some studies claim that differences in policy preferences have sociopsychological 
origins. Men’s higher support for military programs may be rooted in social dominance 
orientation, which implies a stronger preference for inequality among social groups (Pratto et al. 
1997). Differences in economic attitudes, with women being less individualistic and trusting in 
the market, might be partially explained by moral reasoning (Gidengil et al. 2003).  
Regardless of their roots, these observed patterns lead us to expect that policy reflects 
women’s views better under more leftwing governments. Yet, the existing evidence on this 
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relationship is mixed. Griffin et al. (2012) demonstrate that women’s preferences are better 
reflected in US Congress rollcall votes when the Democrats are in the majority. Wängnerud and 
Sundell (2012) find that while some outcomes for women are better in Swedish municipalities 
with leftgreen coalitions, others are not. Meanwhile, Kittilson (2008) finds no effect of left party 
power in government on family leave policy. These discrepancies are likely due to the different 
contexts and measures of women’s interests. Testing the relationship in a crossnational and 
multiissue framework will shed further light on this question. 
Hypothesis 3: 	  	  	    	 	
	
					

# #&#"%%!
Electoral systems play an important role in women’s representation: more proportional electoral 
rules – particularly higher district magnitudes and numbers of parliamentary parties as well as 
lower electoral thresholds – are linked to higher numbers of women in parliament (Matland and 
Studlar 1996; Matland and Taylor 1997; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Rule 1987). Thus, if 
descriptive representation affects substantive representation, we would expect women’s 
preferences to be better represented in more proportional systems. However, electoral rules might 
also influence women’s policy representation through other channels, which have received much 
less attention (cf. Krook and SchwindtBayer 2013: 569; SchwindtBayer and Mishler 2005: 
412).  
Two mechanisms have been proposed in this context. The first involves differences in the 
tendency of female politicians to represent women. Female politicians might be more likely to 
consider it their responsibility to represent women if they were elected via party lists in PR 
systems, where representation is not strongly tied to geographical constituencies like in single
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member district systems (Höhmann 2017; Tremblay 2003). As a result, we might expect 
women’s preferences to be more equally represented in PR systems, even when holding the 
number of women in parliament constant.  
Hypothesis 4a: 			 	 
	 	 	
	
			 			


The second potential effect of electoral rules is through the number of parties. More 
proportional rules make it easier for smaller, and hence more, parties to enter parliament (Cox 
1997). As new parties are incentivized to adopt positions which are held by significant numbers 
of voters but not by any party, a higher number of parties extends the coverage of the political 
spectrum (Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010). As Bernauer, Giger and Rosset 
(2015) argue, this should translate into a better representation of different groups of voters, 
including women, by the parties in parliament. Through the more frequent occurrence of coalition 
governments in multiparty systems, this representation could then be translated into policy 
output.  
Although Bernauer et al. (2015) do not find support for such an effect with regard to 
women’s congruence with party ideology, we might find it in a multidimensional policy space. 
Women often hold different policy priorities from men; importantly, they tend to focus less on 
economic issues that are traditionally associated with the left–right dimension (Campbell 2004; 
Wängnerud 2000). This implies that women might more often desire policy on issues to which 
mainstream parties pay less attention. A higher number of parties in parliament might make it 
more likely that at least one party focuses on these issues. This could be women’s parties, which 
are rare but present in some contexts in Europe, but also other ‘niche parties’ which “politicize 
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sets of issues which were previously outside the dimensions of party competition” (Meguid 2005: 
347; see also Wagner 2012). Even if not in government, these parties may influence the policy 
agenda and incentivize other parties to pass (or maintain) policy in line with women’s policy 
preferences (cf. AbouChadi 2016; CowellMeyers 2011, 2017; de Vries and Hobolt 2012).  
Another potential mechanism through which higher numbers of parties might improve 
women’s representation involves contagion effects. As Matland and Studlar (1996) argue, if one 
party starts nominating more women, others are likely to follow suit (see also Caul 2001 on 
gender quotas). The higher the numbers of parties, the higher the probability that a party 
promoting women’s descriptive representation exists. Similar contagion effects might be at work 
with respect to practices and institutions other than the nomination of women which might 
improve their substantive representation in policy (cf. Kittilson 2013). For instance, multiparty 
systems may be more likely to include parties that give more powerful positions to women, have 
women’s sections, or require gender equity with regard to speaking time. The other parties may 
then be motivated or pressured to pick up similar practices and institutions (Matland and Studlar 
1996). In sum, there are several reasons for why we might expect the number of parties in 
parliament to be associated with stronger policy congruence among women. 
Hypothesis 4b:   	 
   	    	
		
					

	'

I analyze women’s and men’s policy representation using a dataset that includes measures of 
public opinion and policy status for twenty policy issues in 31 European countries. The public 
opinion data comes from eighteen crossnational opinion surveys conducted between 1998 and 
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2013 which cover at least fifteen European countries (Eurobarometer, International Social Survey 
Programme, European Election Study, European Values Study, and European Social Survey). 
Among all items that ask about a specific policy and fulfil several criteria (they must concern 
concrete policies rather than broader issue areas, ask about agreement with policies rather than 
desired changes in policy, and be within the competence of the national government), twenty 
policy items were selected so as to cover a large variety of policy areas (see Table S1 in the SI). 
Overall, the sample contains 491 issuecountry observations. The issues vary in salience (Figure 
S1), measured by the relative number of articles that address the policy issue in the 
  coverage of Europe over a period of three years, starting two years before the respective 
survey was conducted. Selecting issues from surveys independently from whether they have been 
on the political or public agenda is important for avoiding overestimating representation levels, 
which have been found to be higher on more salient issues (e.g. Monroe 1998; Page and Shapiro 
1983). The most salient issue is nuclear power, the least salient one concerns warnings for 
pregnant women and drivers on alcohol bottles. 
Public support for a policy is measured as the percentage of respondents who indicated 
support among all those who were either in favor or against the policy, excluding respondents 
who replied with ‘don’t know’ or ‘neither in favor nor against’ (see Table S2 for descriptive 
statistics). After compiling the set of policy issues from the public opinion surveys, it was 
determined whether or not a policy was in place in a country at the time when the survey was 
conducted (cf. Brooks 1990; Lax and Phillips 2012; Monroe 1998 for similar procedures). This 
was determined on the basis of relevant legal documents, publications by national governmental 
and EU bodies, academic publications, newspaper articles, publications by interest groups and 
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nongovernmental organizations, and expert interviews.
1
 The binary indicator of whether a policy 
was in place was then used to construct a dichotomous measure of congruence between the 
preferences of the majority (of women, men or the entire public) and the policy in place. The 
congruence variable takes the value 1 if the majority was in favor of the policy and the policy 
was in place, or if the majority was against it and it was not in place, while 0 indicates that public 
opinion and policy were not aligned.  
 By measuring public opinion and policy status at the same point in time, this study 
analyzes the 	 of public opinion in policy rather than (dynamic) policy 
	 (e.g. Page and Shapiro 1983; Peters and Ensink 2015; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; 
Stimson et al. 1995). The approach is equivalent or similar to those of other studies of 
congruence of public opinion with policy (Rasmussen et al. 2018) and party positions (e.g. 
Bernauer et al. 2015; Blais and Bodet 2006; Dingler et al. 2018; Golder and Stramski 2010). It 
reflects the idea that policy representation may come about in a variety of ways: not only through 
policymakers responding to public opinion, but also through concurrent reactions of policy
makers and citizens to events or developments or through public opinion formation ‘from above’, 
where the public adjusts its preferences to policy (cf. Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Kuklinski 
and Segura 1995). Indeed, one of the main tasks of political representatives is providing the 
public with information about policy issues and explain their reasons for (not) taking certain 
actions. This means that gender disparities in congruence might not only be a result of unequal 
policy responsiveness but also of gender imbalances in political elites’ justification and 
persuasion efforts.  
                                                           
1
 The process of collecting data on policy and constructing the binary indicator is described in the 
Supplementary Information B. 
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
""(#
The descriptive representation of women is measured by the mean proportion of women in the 
national parliament (single or lower chamber) over four years (3 to ), based on data from the 
InterParliamentary Union (IPU 2018). Government ideology is the average of the mean 
positions of the cabinet parties (weighted by seat share) on the left–right dimension provided by 
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015) over the previous four years. The scale ranges 
from 010, with higher values indicating more rightwing positions. To test the hypotheses about 
electoral systems, I use a dummy variable indicating whether the majority of lower house seats is 
allocated through PR or plurality rules (Keefer 2015). I test the robustness of the results with the 
Gallagher Index indicating the degree of voteseat disproportionality at the last legislative 
election (Gallagher 2014) and with the average district magnitude at the first tier at the last 
legislative election (Bormann and Golder 2013). Lastly, I use Golder’s (2010; Bormann and 
Golder 2013) measure of the Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) from the last 
legislative election prior to the year when the policy data was collected.  

  #(#
The analysis controls for the degree to which women voice their opinions on a policy issue 
relative to men, as we might expect political elites to be more attentive to the section of the public 
that voices their opinions more strongly. It is the ratio of the percentage of female to that of male 
resopndents who expressed policy positions as opposed to ‘neither nor’, ‘don’t know’, or no 
answer.
2
 Furthermore, lower turnout rates among a group might result in lower representation of 
                                                           
2
 The mean response ratios per issue are listed in Table S4. 
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the group’s views in policy – it partly explained the lower congruence of men found by Dingler 
and colleagues (2018). I follow Peters and Ensink (2015), who argue that turnout should be 
particularly unequal at low overall turnout rates and gradually equalize, and include a squared 
term of turnout at the last election before the previous year. I also control for democratic 
experience through the number of years for which a country has maintained a Polity IV score of 
at least +7. Lastly, I include a year trend to account for other factors that might have led to a 
gradual increase in representation equality and because later years include more data from 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 

I start by exploring how women and men differ in their support for the twenty policies. Column 
(a) in Tables 1 and 2 shows the percentages of cases per issue and country, respectively, in which 
the majorities of women and men hold the same policy preference. The agreement levels are 
remarkably high: on almost half of the issues, the majorities of men and women agree on the 
desired direction of policy in all countries. Interestingly, they include the ‘women’s issues’ of 
abortion rights and financial support for caregivers. Agreement is also very high on economic 
issues, while we observe most disagreement on some ‘new politics’ issues including nuclear 
power, animal rights, and adoption rights of samesex couples. Preference agreement is 
remarkably high in all countries (Table 2), with the lowest levels reaching around 70 per cent in 
Switzerland, Belgium, and Norway. Across issues and countries, the majorities of men and 
women desire the same policy 87 per cent of the time. Figures S2 and S3 provide more detailed 
illustrations of the patterns. 
[TABLES 1 AND 2 AROUND HERE] 
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As we would expect based on these observations, women and men have fairly similar 
levels of policy congruence, as columns (b) and (c) in Tables 1 and 2 show. On average, policy 
reflects men’s preferences 63 per cent and women’s preferences 60 per cent of the time (Table 3). 
While evaluating these levels of congruence is somewhat difficult given the lack of clear 
normative expectations, they are higher than the 50 per cent which Lax and Phillips (2012) find 
across the US states and could be interpreted as good news for democracy in Europe. However, 
the picture of equality in representation changes when we focus only on the 62 cases where the 
majorities of women and men disagree with each other (second row in Table 3). Here, we see 
clear and statistically significant disparities, with men’s preferences being congruent with policy 
63 per cent of the time and women’s in only 37 per cent of cases.  
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
However, we should also take the preferences of the overall majority into account (cf. 
Brunner et al. 2013). Representation could be considered fair if policy reflects the views of a 
majority of citizens. A social group can then be considered ‘overrepresented’ if a policy is 
congruent with its preference while being incongruent with the overall public. The bottom line of 
Table 3 shows that when the majority of men disagrees with the public majority, they get their 
preference 57 per cent of the time. For women, this occurs in only 33 per cent of cases. With 
=0.07 the difference is not statistically significant by conventional standards, but we need to 
keep in mind that the number of cases included in this sample is quite low. Thus, the findings 
suggest that although women and men in Europe often hold the same policy preferences, when 
their views diverge women tend to be represented less often, lending support to Hypothesis 1.
3
  
                                                           
3
 The Supplementary Material C provides analyses of the relationship between policy and the degree of 
support for it. It is stronger for men than women, providing further support for this conclusion. 
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What explains why women or men are represented in the instances where their majorities have 
different policy positions? To answer this question, I regress the binary indicator of women’s 
policy congruence on the predictors and controls. I only include the cases with majority 
disagreement in the analysis, which means that 1 indicates congruence with the majority of 
women and 0 congruence with the majority of men. Table 4 displays the results of five logistic 
regression models: the first four test the effect of each independent variable separately along with 
the controls; the fifth model includes all variables.
 4
 Among the control variables, only year has a 
significant effect, though only in Model 1.  
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
The proportion of women in parliament is not associated with women’s policy 
congruence in any of the model specifications. This holds when it is the only variable included 
and when a squared term is added to test whether a ‘critical mass’ of women in parliament is 
necessary for the effect to take hold (results not shown) (Bratton and Ray 2002; Dahlerup 1988). 
While this runs counter to the widely held belief that women are more likely to be represented by 
women, it is in line with the conclusions of several other studies (e.g. Bernauer et al. 2015; 
Dingler et al. 2018; Griffin et al. 2012; Thomas 1991). Similarly, we find no significant effect for 
the ideological position of the government. This might not be so surprising given that women and 
men largely agree on the economic issues that tend to be most closely associated with left and 
right, which are thus largely absent from the sample.  
                                                           
4
 Iceland is excluded from these analysis as it is not included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. 
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Moving on to the electoral system indicators (Model 3), we find that PR and majoritarian 
systems do not differ in their propensity to represent women’s or men’s views in policy. In 
contrast, the higher the number of parties in parliament, the higher the chance of women’s 
congruence as compared to men’s. This statistically significant effect persists when including the 
other predictors (Model 5), suggesting that it does not mask an effect of electoral system 
proportionality and is not mediated by the proportion of women in parliament. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient of PR systems becomes statistically significant when controlling for the other 
variables, suggesting that policy is more congruent with women’s preferences than men’s in 
majoritarian systems. Yet, since neither the average district magnitude nor the Gallagher Index 
have a similar effect (Table S5), this finding is not extremely robust. 
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
The substantive meaning of the positive coefficient of the number of parliamentary parties 
is illustrated in Figure 2. The average predicted probability of policy being congruent with 
women rather than men is at only 7 per cent in systems with effective numbers of parliamentary 
parties of around two, like Malta in 2010 and the UK in 2002 (the other variables are at their 
observed means). Women and men are equally likely to be represented in systems with around 
five parliamentary parties. At higher numbers of parties, policy is more likely to be congruent 
with women than with men, and increasingly so. However, only few countries have such high 
numbers of parties (see the histogram in the same figure) – the average parliament in the sample 
has an ENPP of 4.3, where women’s probability of congruence is 34 per cent and that of men 66 
per cent.
5
 
                                                           
5
 The significant positive effect of ENPP in Model 5 is robust to excluding the few cases with an ENPP of 
more than 6. 
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[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
The result lends support to the proposition that parliaments with more parties are more 
likely to include a party that promotes policies supported by women. To explore this further, I 
take a closer look at the issues on which women and men disagree. As we saw earlier, these are 
mostly ‘new politics’ issues that are less strongly associated with traditional left–right politics. 
Table 5 shows astonishing crossnational coherence in the gendered preference patterns on these 
issues: on all of them, women take the same position in every country, as do men. Women show 
a strong tendency to favor policies championed by Green and leftlibertarian parties, such as bans 
on nuclear energy and adoption rights for samesex couples. Does this mean that women’s higher 
congruence levels in contexts with more parties is due to the stronger presence and power of 
these types of parties? 
[TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
I test this proposition in two ways. First, I include a measure of the government position 
on the GALTAN dimension based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, where lower values 
indicate more libertarian/postmaterialist positions and higher values more 
traditional/authoritarian views (Bakker et al. 2015). In addition, I measure whether a Green party 
was represented in parliament in the previous year, based on the ParlGov data (Döring and 
Manow 2016). As Table 6 shows, neither of the measures affect women’s policy congruence 
when substituted for the ENPP variable. This suggests that, rather than the presence of Green or 
other leftlibertarian parties in multiparty systems, it could be the higher likelihood that 	 
party represents women’s preferences particularly well which explains the effect of the numbers 
of parliamentary parties.  


	
	 
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Women are still in the minority in most parliaments and positions of political power across 
Europe and the world. But are the policies that govern societies also less reflective of the 
preferences of women than those of men? This study is the first to investigate this question by 
looking a diverse set of concrete policies across Europe. It revealed that the majorities of women 
and men have remarkably similar policy preferences on many issues. In these cases, policy is 
equally representative of the views of both genders, although the representation of one group 
could be ‘coincidental’ (cf. Enns 2015). Importantly, however, when women and men have 
divergent policy positions, men are more likely to see their demands fulfilled. This insight 
corresponds with Homola’s (2017) finding of a male bias in party responsiveness, while 
diverging from recent findings that parliaments in Europe present women’s ideological views as 
well as men’s (Bernauer et al. 2015) and their positions on more specific policy dimensions even 
better (Dingler et al. 2018). These contrasting findings highlight the value of examining policy 
representation on various policy dimensions as well as at different stages of the policymaking 
process, from the drafting of election manifestos to concrete policy outcomes, at which biases 
might be introduced and corrected (cf. Htun et al. 2013).  
In contrast to common beliefs which are based on prominent theoretical accounts 
(Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995) and backed by several studies (e.g. Bratton and Ray 2002; 
Kittilson 2008; SchwindtBayer and Mishler 2005), no effect of the proportion of women in 
parliament on their substantive representation in policy was found. This result, which echoes 
findings by Dingler et al.’s (2018) closely related study, could be seen as a further encouragement 
to shift our attention away from mere numbers and towards the actions of ‘critical actors’ and the 
specific institutions and structures in which they operate (cf. Childs and Krook 2009; Childs and 
Withey 2006; Sawer 2012). At the same time, the role of descriptive representation might be 
restricted to issues with particular relevance to women (e.g. Bratton and Ray 2002; Kittilson 
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2008; SchwindtBayer and Mishler 2005; Wängnerud and Sundell 2012). Since women and men 
largely agreed on issues like abortion and support for caregivers, this study would not have 
picked up such effects. Other policyrelated factors might also condition the relationship: Bratton 
and Ray (2002), for instance, highlight the importance of women’s presence in the phase of 
policy innovation.  
Similarly, the finding that women’s relative policy congruence is not enhanced by more 
leftwing governments might be due to the study’s focus on issues with gender disagreement, 
which was low on economic issues closely related to left–right ideology. Instead, women tended 
to be more supportive of libertarian and proenvironmental policies (cf. Dingler et al. 2018). 
However, neither governments’ positions on the authoritarianlibertarian dimension nor the 
presence of Green parties could explain women’s representation on these issues. Thus, the 
observed effect of women’s higher congruence in contexts with more parliamentary parties does 
not seem to be explained by Green parties promoting libertarian and environment policies. This 
could be because the success of Green parties incentivizes mainstream parties to 	 emphasize 
environmental issues in order to prevent boosting the challenger’s popularity (AbouChadi 2016).  
However, contagion mechanisms might nevertheless be at work. They might increase the 
likelihood of the presence of a party with internal institutions and practices that promote the 
substantive representation of women’s preferences, which might ‘spread’ to other parties. Since 
the number of women in parliament was controlled for in the analysis, these need to be practices 
that go beyond increasing the number of women (Matland and Studlar 1996; Caul 2001) – for 
instance, the promotion of women into leadership roles, women’s sections within parties, or rules 
for alternation between male and female speakers at party meetings, which the German Greens 
have. Research designs that allow investigating the dynamics of policy responsiveness to public 
opinion would provide additional valuable insights in this context.  
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Further research into the topic should also incorporate policy priorities. One the one hand, 
this might improve our evaluations of the policy representation of women and men, which 
arguably improves when they are well represented on the issues they care most about and when 
their respective policy priorities are high on the agendas of policymakers. On the other hand, it 
might help us determine what explains gender disparities in representation. The issues on which 
women desire policy change might be particularly salient to them, which means that finding out 
which institutions and other factors increase policymakers’ attention to women’s priorities might 
ultimately help us understand what explains the representation of their positions. 
Finally, like much of the research on women’s representation, this study compared all 
women to all men, not least because of data restrictions imposed by the crossnational, multi
issue, policycentered approach. Yet, further research should take individuals’ diversity in 
backgrounds and views into account, as inequality in representation is likely to exist not only 
 but also 	 women and men. Intersectional approaches thus have the potential to 
uncover additional patterns and gaps in representation and enrichen our knowledge about their 
causes.

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	+


(#,- Preference agreement and policy congruence by issue 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 
Agreement 
between the 
majorities of 
men and 
women  
(% of cases) 
Congruence 
between the 
majority of men 
and policy  
(% of cases) 
Congruence 
between the 
majority of 
women and 
policy  
(% of cases) 
Number of 
countries per 
issue 
Warnings on alcohol bottles 100 7 7 27 
Animal experiments  55 71 58 31 
Smoking ban 93 71 64 28 
Tobacco vending machines 78 78 56 27 
Embryonic stem cell research 77 74 65 31 
Nuclear power 56 74 67 27 
Minimum wage 100 89 89 27 
Support for caregivers 100 86 86 28 
Detention without charge 89 56 44 18 
Samesex marriage 93 67 59 27 
Adoption by samesex couples 74 84 84 31 
Abortion 100 74 74 27 
Citizenship 100 40 40 20 
Progressive tax 100 94 94 16 
Income and pension 94 56 63 16 
Refugees and work 95 43 38 21 
Online voting 75 38 63 16 
Military in Afghanistan 80 87 93 15 
Mandatory retirement 100 47 47 30 
Plastic waste disposal 100 21 21 28 
Total 87 63 60 491 



 
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(#.- Preference agreement and policy congruence by country 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 
Agreement 
between the 
majorities of men 
and women  
(% of cases) 
Congruence 
between the 
majority of men 
and policy  
(% of cases) 
Congruence 
between the 
majority of 
women and policy  
(% of cases) 
Number of 
issues per 
country 
Austria 95 79 74 19 
Belgium 71 41 71 17 
Bulgaria 93 67 60 15 
Croatia 86 71 57 7 
Cyprus 93 71 64 14 
Czech Republic 82 65 47 17 
Denmark 79 53 53 19 
Estonia 92 77 85 13 
Finland 84 63 58 19 
France 85 70 65 20 
Germany 75 60 55 20 
Greece 100 65 65 17 
Hungary 100 65 65 17 
Iceland 75 75 50 4 
Ireland 95 47 42 19 
Italy 76 47 47 17 
Latvia 94 44 50 16 
Lithuania 100 69 69 13 
Luxembourg 88 59 47 17 
Malta 92 69 62 13 
Norway 73 45 55 11 
Poland 88 53 53 17 
Portugal 90 80 70 20 
Romania 85 77 62 13 
Slovakia 100 60 60 15 
Slovenia 94 47 41 17 
Spain 90 65 55 20 
Sweden 80 80 80 20 
Switzerland 67 67 33 6 
Netherlands 89 74 74 19 
UK 80 65 65 20 
Total 87 63 60 491 
 



 
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(#/- Opinionpolicy congruence among men and women 
 
Men Women 
Difference in 
proportions test 
Share of cases with policy congruence among all cases  
63% 
(310/491) 
60% 
(294/491) 
@=1.05 
=.294 
Share of cases with policy congruence among cases 
with disagreement between men and women 
63% 
(39/62) 
37% 
(23/62) 
@=2.87 
=.004 
Share of cases with policy congruence among cases 
where they disagree with the public majority  
57% 
(13/23) 
33% 
(13/39) 
@=1.79 
=.074 





 
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(#0-Logistic regressions of women’s policy congruence
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proportion of women .04 (.04)    .07 (.05) 
Government ideology  .39 (.32)   .66 (.42) 
PR system   .36 (1.09)  4.17 (1.89)* 
Number of parties    .74 (.29)* 1.18 (.46)* 
Response ratio 16.93 (9.61) 17.43 (9.88) 16.06 (9.67) 15.63 (10.81) 11.05 (10.62) 
Turnout .02 (.35) .13 (.33) .20 (.37) .38 (.39) .39 (.48) 
Turnout
2 
.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Age of democracy .00 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Year .23 (.11)* .12 (.11) .17 (.10) .18 (.11) .04 (.14) 
Constant 16.87 (15.65) 13.32 (15.30) 7.85 (16.26) .71 (17.77) 3.99 (22.40) 
Pseudo Rsquared .20 .20 .18 .28 .37 
N  61 61 61 61 61 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
  
 
 
 
 
 

 
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(#1-Women’s and men’s policy preferences and policy on issues with disagreement between 
the majorities of women and men 
 (a) (b) (c) 
 
Cases (countries) with 
majority of women in 
favor1  
Cases (countries) with 
majority of men in 
favor1  
Cases (countries) with 
policy in place1  
Allowing animal experiments  0/14 14/14 9/14 
Ban on smoking in bars and pubs 2/2 0/2 0/2 
Ban on tobacco vending machines 6/6 0/6 0/6 
Ban on embryonic stem cell 
research 
7/7 0/7 2/7 
Supporting nuclear power 0/12 12/0 7/12 
Allowing detention without 
charge without time limit 
2/2 0/2 0/2 
Ban on samesex marriage 0/2 2/2 2/2 
Allowing adoption by samesex 
couples 
8/8 0/8 4/8 
Allowing earning an income while 
receiving a pension 
0/1 1/1 0/1 
Allowing asylum seekers to work 1/1 0/1 0/1 
Implementing online voting 0/4 4/4 0/4 
Sending military to Afghanistan 0/3 3/3 1/3 
1 The samples only include the cases with disagreement between the majorities of women and men.
 
 
 
 
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(#2-Logistic regressions of women’s policy congruence with government GALTAN 
position and Green party presence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Descriptive representation .08 (.04) .07 (.05) .10 (.05) .07 (.05) 
Government ideology   .65 (.49) .82 (.56) .85 (.44) .66 (.46) 
PR system 1.77 (1.34) 4.27 (1.89)* 2.90 (1.75) 4.18 (2.03)* 
Number of parties (ENPP)  1.21 (.47)*  1.18 (.49)* 
Government GALTAN .09 (.53) .28 (.61)   
Green party in parliament   1.33 (1.06) .01 (1.14) 
Response ratio 15.92 (10.06) 10.30 (11.60) 14.80 (10.27) 11.04 (11.67) 
Turnout .08 (.36) .39 (.48) .07 (.35) .39 (.48) 
Turnout
2 
.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
Age of democracy .00 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
Year .12 (.13) .02 (.14) .10 (.12) .04 (.14) 
Constant 19.77 (16.97) 5.68 (22.75) 19.80 (17.17) 3.97 (22.46) 
Pseudo Rsquared .25 .38 .27 .37 
N  61 61 61 61 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
  
Page 39 of 52
Cambridge University Press
The European Political Science Review
40 
 
 
+$&,- Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (single chamber or lower 
house) in Europe as of April 1, 2018 
#	: IPU (2018)  
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
+$&.-Predicted probabilities of women’s policy congruence based on electoral system 
proportionality (ENPP)  
2	1 Probabilities are based on Model 2 and calculated from average marginal effects (all other variables at their 
observed values).  
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